From Ebola to other emerging infectious diseases: the case for strong risk assessment, mitigation and prevention



Yambuku Mission Hospital, DRC (Zaire), 1976



Yambuku Mission, DRC, 1976





Nurses, Yambuku Mission Hospital

Maternity, Yambuku Mission Hospital



Deceased health workers, Yambuku Mission Hospital, DRC, 1976





Ngaliema Hospital, Kinshasa, DRC




Filoform virus, first identified 1976, CDC (Atlanta) and Porton (UK)



Source: CDC

Animal market, near Yambuku, DRC




Patient record, outpatient department, Yambuku Hospital, DRC, August 1976

28 48 1	Mago ba alima	9.1	Bosanga	Lilongo X	Helminthiase	127/81	32/8	VA	=1
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						1			T. F.

Hospital Implements, Yambuku, 1976



Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever by mode of transmission, Yambuku DRC,1976



Risk assessment, Ebola haemorrhagic fever, 1976

- Two highly lethal outbreaks simultaneously
 - Zaire (Yambuku) 280/318
 - Sudan (Maridi) 151/284
- Nosocomial transmission drove outbreaks into health workers and through them to community
- Animal reservoir suspected
- Unknown potential to reappear one time emergence vs. periodic re-emergence

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Mission Hosptial, Tandala Zaire (DRC), 1977



- 1 clinical case/died
- 1 contact (sister) fit possible case definition/survived
- 1 historical probable clinical case/recovered,1972




Ebola haemorrhagic fever surveillance, Zaire, 1981–1985: antibody in reported possible, probable and clinical cases

Case definition	$ \begin{array}{c} 1981 \\ (n = 0) \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} 1982 \\ (n = 4) \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{c} 1983 \\ (n = 36) \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} 1984 \\ (n = 27) \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} 1985 \\ (n = 31) \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} 1981 - 1985 \\ (n = 98) \end{array} $
Possible	0	0	0	1	2	3
Clinical	0	1	4	2	4	11
Probable	0	2	5	0	0	7
Total	0	3	9	3	6	21

NOTE. n = no. of surveillance reports investigated.

Source: WHO

Ebola haemorrhagic fever surveillance, Zaire, 1981–1985: villages reporting probable, possible and clinical cases



Risk assessment, Ebola haemorrhagic fever, 1977

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- Nosocomial transmission can be prevented
- Animal reservoir suspected
- Periodic re-emergence occurs


Kikwit General Hospital, Zaire, 1995



Nursing sisters, Kikwit General Hospital, Zaire, 1995



Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever by mode of transmission, Kikwit Zaire, 1995



Source: WHO/CDC

Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever, Mayibout Gabon, 1996



19 index cases: found and butchered freshly dead chimpanzee

•18 family members infected

No nosocomial transmission

•21/37 (70%) fatal

Tai Forest, Cote d'Ivoire, 1992





Chimpanzee die off, Tai Forest sociology research project area, 1992 - 1994







Risk assessment, Ebola haemorrhagic fever, 1994

- Periodic re-emergence occurs
- Highly lethal outbreaks occur periodically when health workers become infected
- Nosocomial transmission can be prevented
- Animal link to transmission confirmed
 - DRC (Yambuku and Tandala)
 - Cameroun




The search for a reservoir in nature, Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever, 1996



Source:: Emerging Infectious Diseases


The search for a reservoir in nature, Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever, 2001 - 2003




Risk assessment, Ebola haemorrhagic fever, 2002

- Periodic re-emergence occurs
- Highly lethal outbreaks occur periodically when health workers become infected
- Nosocomial transmission can be prevented
- Animal link to transmission confirmed
- Bat probable reservoir in nature

Selected Ebola outbreaks, 1976 - 2002



Ebola outbreak, Guinea, December 2013 - present




Ebola outbreaks, West Africa 2014

Guinea
506 cases
373 deaths

Sierra Leone 730 cases 315 deaths

Liberia
599 cases
323 deaths

Nigeria
13 cases
2 deaths



Initial Ebola economic impact, 2014



Breaches in species barrier since 1976















Infection	Animal linked	Year 1 st reported
Ebola virus	Bats	1976
HIV-1	Primates	1981
E. coli O157:H7	Cattle	`1982
Borrelia burgdorferi	Rodents	1982
HIV-2	Primates	1986
Hendra virus	Bats	1994
BSE/vCJD	Cattle	1996
Australian lyssavirus	s Bats	1996
Influenza A(H5N1)	Chickens	1997
Nipah virus	Bats	1999
SARS coronavirus	Palm civets	2003
Influenza A(H1N1)	Swine	2009
MERS coronavirus	? Camel	2012
Influenza A(H7N9)	Chickens	2013

Nipah virus infection, Malaysia, 1998-1999



•Source: Chua KB, Journal of Clinical Virology, April 2003

Nipah virus outbreaks, humans, 1998 - 2008

Dates	Location	No. cases	No. deaths	CFR(%)
1998-1999	Malaysia;	265	105	40
1999	Singapore	11	1	9
2001	W. Bengal, India	66	45	68
2001	Bangladesh	13	9	69
2003	Bangladesh	12	8	67
2004	Bangladesh	29	22	76
	Bangladesh	36	27	75
2005	Bangladesh	12	11	92
2007	W. Bengal, India	5	5	100
2007	Bangladesh	15	8	54
2008	Bangladesh	11	6	54

Changing Nipah virus epidemiology: Bangladesh and India

- ✓ Human-to-human transmission first suspected 2001, hospitalized patients, India
- ✓ Human to human transmission suspected again in 2003, 2005, and 2007, Bangladesh
 - cases could not be linked to domestic animal exposure, including pigs
 - index cases not identified: one potential exposure to bat guano in palm wine


Precautionary measures: community agreement to cover the collection containers



Community agriculture meeting




Swiss cheese events in epidemiology and public health



• James Reason: BMJ 2000;320:768-770

Shifting the paradigm from emergency response to prevention



Knowledge, attitude and practices study, 4 mining companies, DRC

Recognition of Impact of disease outbreak on mining companies:

ArcelorMittal, London Mining and African Minerals - postponed expansion plans and evacuated workers during current Ebola outbreak

Shares immediately fell in London trading

Clear recognition that a healthy community is a productive workforce

Community malaria control programmes reduce malaria-related work days lost by 94%; malaria-related spending at clinic by 76%;

Clear understanding of corporate social responsibility - "it is the right thing"

Must respond to NGO and other social pressures

KAP study, 4 mining companies, DRC

Clear understanding of potential barriers to improving current risk assessment/ mitigation/prevention

Costs because of demand for more services and replacement of government investment in public health

Corruption and lack of enforcement of regulations.

Clear understanding of facilitators to adopt risk assessment/mitigation and prevention strategies

Good practices in place in mining sites/camp to prevent, detect and control diseases.

Unambiguous company policies and enforcement (e.g. no bushmeat consumption in camp, provision of sufficient sources of protein in diet).

Ex Kulinda Afya – 11 Aug 2014

- One day desk top exercise: Katanga province DRC
- Objective: to raise awareness about emerging infections, their risk assessment, mitigation and prevention among senior field staff of mining companies and local government health officials.



Participants, Ex Kulinda Afya, 2014

 25 participants: mining companies, provincial health authorities, animal health authorities, school of public health University of Lubumbashi

 Four groups with mining company, health and animal health representatives in each




Format of Ex Kulinda Afya exercise

Outbreak scenario (VHF) at mining site and town in a fictional African Country

Participants discussed and considered:

- Their initial response to outbreak of unknown disease
- Resources available to deal with an outbreak in community and in mining facilities
- Communication with and education of mine employees and surrounding areas
- How plans might be developed to mitigate the risk of future outbreaks



Conclusions of discussions during Ex Kulinda Afya

Internal risk mitigation procedures are effective in maintaining healthy workforce

External risk mitigation and preparedness procedures for outbreak alert and response are ad hoc and could be improved by:

- Regional level: increased cross working and coordination of public health activities between health representatives, the mining industries, and provincial representatives of non-governmental organisations.
- Local level: increased engagement and health education between the mining industries and the communities around the mining sites, with particular emphasis on risk assessment, mitigation, prevention and alert for zoonotic infections.
- Sharing of financial, technical and logistical resources between mining industries and the provincial health authorities:
 - equipment to assist in the isolation and quarantining of patients, and

access to laboratory testing

Potential role of mining companies in mitigation and prevention

Assessing risks from endemic and emerging infectious diseases in the communities and mining camps

Using available risk assessment resources, such as USAID toolkit, to optimise internal risk mitigation processes

Regular desktop scenarios/exercises to ensure external preparedness

Engaging (either individually or collectively) national and local governments as partners in infectious disease risk mitigation and prevention

Surveillance and alert networks in partnership with local communities

Health promotion/education/safe water/sanitation

Building trust

USAID Toolkit for assessment of internal risk management/mitigation processes

- To evaluate potential exposure points for diseases transmitted from animals and mitigate the risk of exposure
- Based on accepted best practice to address public health and environmental issues
- Adopting the practices could secure business continuity by securing the health of the workforce and neighbouring communities



There will always be a risk of emerging

